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Our Waning Judicial Power
Robert N. Wilkin
OUR CONSTITUTION provides that "all legislative Powers"
shall be vested in Congress;' "the executive Power" in the Presi-
dent;2 and then Article III states: "The judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." This grant of power received a very thorough analysis
by the Supreme Court in 1816. The Court of Appeals of Virginia
had refused to obey a mandate on the ground that "the appellate
power of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend
to this court, under a sound construction of the constitution of the
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United States." This re-
quired a thorough in-
vestigation of the mean-
ing of the words used in
Article III.
Justice Story, speak-
ing for the Supreme
Court, said: "The ob-
ject of the constitution
was to establish three
great departments of
goverrhent; the legisla-
five, the executive and
the judicial department.
The first was to pass
laws, the second, to ap-
prove and execute them,
and the third, to expound and enforce them. Without the latter,
it would be impossible to carry into effect some of the express pro-
visions of the constitution."
Justice Story then asked: "Could Congress have lawfully
refused to create a Supreme Court, or to vest in it the constitu-
tional jurisdiction?" He answered that question by stating that
the language of the Article throughout was mandatory upon the
legislature. "Its obligatory force" was "imperative." Congress
could not "without a violation Qf its duty, have refused to carry
IU. S. CONsT. Art. I, §1.
2U. S. CONsT. Art. II, § 1.
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it into operation." And he added: "It is a duty to vest the whole
judicial power . . . . It would seem, therefore, to follow, that Con-
gress are bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest
all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively
vested in the United States, and of which the Supreme Court
cannot take original cognizance."3
The Court was aware that it was dealing with questions which
would affect "the very foundation of our government and the
extent and character of the grant of judicial power." The Court
affirmed that "Upon their right decision rests some of the most
solid principles which have hitherto been supposed to sustain and
protect the constitution itself." After holding that it was an
imperative duty of the Congress to provide a Supreme Court and
inferior courts in which the judicial power should vest, the court
then said that "it cannot be denied that when it is vested, it may
be exercised to the utmost constitutional extent. . . . And as there
is nothing in the constitution which restrains or limits this power,
it must, therefore . . . subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in
its own nature, it is susceptible." 4
Early in our history it was also decided that the Constitution
should be interpreted in the light of English and Colonial history
and the history of our jurisprudence. In the case mentioned, it
was held that judicial power should be construed in the light of
practice familiar "in courts acting according to the course of the
common law." In subsequent cases the Court recognized that
"the Constitution of the United States was ordained . . . by
descendants of Englishmen who inherited the traditions of English
law and history," 5 and that "the interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its
provisions are framed in the language of the English common law,
and are to be read in the light of its history. "6
As Judge Hutcheson has said, the Founders planted here
"English notions of the rights of Englishmen." He insisted that
to understand the Constitution truly, "one must know and under-
stand what went into it and made it up, the springs from which
it welled, the sources, the spirit of it all." 7
3Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 328, 329, 330, 331
(1816).
41d. at 324, 337, 338.
5Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 530, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 118 (1884).
6Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 569 (1888).
7 HUTCHESON (JOSEPH C.), LAW As LIBERATOR 63, 65 (1937).
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The influence of judicial power in English history can hardly
be over-estimated. The practical operation of constitutionalism
was developed in the Middle Ages.8 The great jurists and scholas-
tics who had been trained in the Civil Law of Rome and the
Canon Law of the Church studied the philosophy of law and
examined the purpose and function of kingship, the State, in the
light of classical humanism and Christian ethic. They discarded
the theory of absolute sovereignty and the divine right of kings.
They acknowledged that positive law was supported by and sub-
ject to the higher, or Natural, law. The ministers of state and
justiciars, because of the independence and security of their posi-
tions as officers of the Church, could for the first time in history
give practical effect to the theory of government subject to law.
An Archdeacon who had served twenty years as a judge (Bracton)
wrote the famous words Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub
Deo et lege, which Coke three hundred years later quoted to King
James. No one familiar with the history of the conflict between
the Court of Common Pleas and the Crown courts, such as the
Court of Requests, the Star Chamber, and the Court of High
Commission, can be unmindful of the contribution of the judges
of England to the implementation of the rights and immunities
which we now find crystallized in Magna Charta, the Petition of
Right, the Bill of Rights, and finally in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and our own Constitution. All our basic freedoms were
forged and formed by the judicial process.
The great difficulty is, however, that in spite of the magnificent
accomplishments of the judicial power, there is still wanting a
general or popular appreciation of its place and purpose. Although
the judicial function is the very source and guaranty of our basic
rights and security, the popular tendency is to think of the judicial
process as only a restraint on liberty. The general trend, there-
fore, toward ever greater freedom (the "popular vortex", as
Madison called it) tends continually to weaken the judicial power.
Subversive agents, moreover, who know the effect of judicial
power, try to undermine it.
The general effect of our political evolution during recent
years has been to strengthen the legislative and the executive
departments of government at the expense of the judicial depart-
ment. Because of the very nature of the judicial department, it
8WILIuN (ROBERT N.), THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND INDUSTRIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL DispuTrs, pt. 1, pp. 12, 13 and authorities there cited (1947).
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being without initiative and burdened by a self-imposed reluctance
and sense of propriety, its judiciary refrains from self-assertion and
generally defers to other departments. In recent years, moreover,
many judges, moved by a false sense of liberalism, have been
reluctant to defend the judicial function and have imposed upon
it unwarranted limitations. Thus the courts themselves have con-
tributed to the erosion of the judicial power.
It is high time to consider again the purpose and function of
this department of government. That there has been, and is still,
a gradual decadence of judicial power is quite apparent; but the
trouble is that there is no understanding of the significance of such
change by the people generally, or even by lawyers generally. The
need for some re-appraisement is made apparent by occurrences
of the day and by what is being written by able jurists and
scholars.
In the daily newspapers there is revealed a widespread effort
to traduce and discredit the judicial office. Counsel representing
the defendants on trial in New York on a charge of conspiracy
to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government
of the United States, have tried to dissipate and defeat the regu-
lar judicial processes in order to bring the trial to an inconclusive
termination. Evidently they have sought to repeat the debacle of
the espionage trial in Washington. That trial, after three months
of bullying and bickering, terminated in the death of the judge.
In another city a prominent newspaper recently had false entries
inserted into a court's file in order to show that a divorce could
be obtained by improper means. Such an act was of course a
most extraordinary and outrageous contempt of court, but the most
appalling revelation was the reaction of many people to the inci-
dent. They seemed to rejoice over what they thought had dis-
credited the court or exposed it to ridicule. Too many people
have no realization that the effect of such occurrences is the
demoralization of the very source and security of their freedom.
The legislative hearings with reference to the repeal of the
Taft-Hartley Act reveal an unwarranted suspicion and dread of
the judicial process, on the part not only of labor leaders, but also
of many legislators. In spite of the fact that the right to do col-
lective bargaining was first recognized in a court of law,' and in
spite of the record of satisfactory accomplishment by the judicial
9Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metcalf (45 Mass.) 111 (1842).
1OWILxIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62.
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process wherever it has been employed with reference to industrial
disputes,"0 courts are still mistrusted. That process which is
resorted to for the settlement of all other controversies continues
to be spoken of as an evil in labor-management relations. The
legislators of our state and national governments failed to pass laws
against economic oppression and bad practices, and then when
the resentment against such oppression and practices resulted in
open violence, and courts were called upon to maintain peace and
order by injunction, the legislators became voluble about the
futility of the injunction for the settlement of labor problems.
Instead of enacting general laws for the regulation of labor-
management relations and the prevention of imperialistic practices,
the tendency of legislatures for many years has been merely to
restrict the power of courts to issue injunctions; cf. the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Clayton Act, and the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
A further exemplification of legislative efforts to restrict the
judicial power are found in the Act creating the Emergency Court
of Appeals," the law restricting appeals from the orders of the
National Labor Relations Board,' 2 and other limitations upon the
right of citizens to resort to the ordinary trial courts of their com-
munity for the protection of their rights and immunities.
Paragraph I of Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution
provides that "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction ;-to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;-between citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects." And paragraph 2 defines the "original
jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court, and then provides: "In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
The exceptions and regulations which the Congress has made
and the Supreme Court has accepted have now engendered a very
1156 STAT. 32 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 924 (Supp. 1945).
1261 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (f).
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grave apprehension that the appellate power of the Court may
become a nullity. The American Bar Association has recommended
an amendment to the Constitution in order to preserve the appel-
late power of the Court and place it beyond the reach of destruc-
tive legislative influence. 3 Justice Roberts has spoken and written
very convincingly in support of such an amendment. 4
The Supreme Court has itself contributed to the delimitation
of judicial power. It has so restricted the power of courts to
punish for contempt' that one of the judges of our United States
District Courts has said: "A District Judge must be able to show
powder bums, if he expects to be upheld in a contempt proceed-
ing.""6 But even more alarming is the tendency of the Supreme
Court to impose other restrictions and prohibitions upon the exer-
cise of judicial power. The Court's acceptance of the power of
Congress to define the territorial jurisdiction of the inferior courts
and to specify their jurisdiction as to subject-matter cannot be
questioned. But it is a grave question whether the Congress ever
had any authority to qualify or delimit the judicial power which
courts should exercise after the territory and the subject-matter
of their jurisdiction had been fixed. If Congress has the right to
say that courts shall not issue injunctions in certain cases, there
is no reason why it cannot forbid courts to employ other remedies,
such as Specific Performance, Quo Warranto, Reformation, Can-
cellation, or otherwise direct the judicial processes. The holding of
the Court in Lockerty v. Phillipsl" that the Constitution does not
require Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular
inferior federal court seems in direct contradiction of the Constitu-
tion as interpreted in the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.
In the recent case of Lockerty v. Phillips, Chief Justice Stone,
speaking for the Court, said:
All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive
their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority
to "ordain and establish" inferior courts, conferred on Con-
gress by Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution. Article
III left Congress free to establish inferior federal courts or
not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to
create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies
1334 A.B.A.J. 1072-1073 (1948).
1435 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949).
'sBridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941); Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 Sup. Ct. 110 (1941).
16MCCOLLOCH (CLAUDE), NoTEs OF A DISTICa JUDGE (1948).
17319 U.S. 182, 63 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1943).
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afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this
Court as Congress might prescribe. Kline v. Burke Con-
struction Co., 260 U S. 226, 234, and cases cited; Mclntire
v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506. The Congressional power to
ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent,
or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may
seem proper for the public good .... [cases cited]. In the
light of the explicit language of the Constitution and our
decisions, it is plain that Congress has power to provide
that the equity jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of the
Act, or of regulations promulgated under it, be restricted
to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of its decisions,
to this Court. Nor can we doubt the authority of Congress
to require that a plaintiff seeking such equitable relief
resort to the Emergency Court only after pursuing the pre-
scribed administrative procedure.18
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, and as a matter
of public policy, in the full light of Anglo-American history, some
of these general statements may well be doubted. As Professor
Corwin said with reference to the case of Yakus v. United States,
the Supreme Court confused jurisdiction and judicial power. 9 If
such legislative power is to be upheld, it would better be placed
on, and limited to, the war emergency, as suggested by Justice
Roberts.
Evidently the Court itself had some misgivings, for the opinion
in the Lockerty case closed with the following statement:
Since appellants seek only an injunction which the dis-
trict court is without authority to give, their bill of com-
plaint was rightly dismissed. We have no occasion to
determine now whether, or to what extent, appellants may
challenge the constitutionality of the Act or the Regulation
in courts other than the Emergency Court, either by way of
defense to a criminal prosecution or in a civil suit brought
for some other purpose than to restrain enforcement of
the Act or regulations issued under it.
But this reservation was modified by the opinion in the Yakus
case. Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion in that case pre-
sented the "crux"' of the problem:
... whenever the judicial power is called into play, it is
responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other
iIsd. at 187, 188, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1022, 1023.
19See McCoLLoCH (CLAUDE). NOTES OF A DISTRICT JUDGE 18 (1948).
1949)
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authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial
body to disregard it. The problem therefore is not solely
one of individual right or due process of law. It is equally
one of the separation and independence of the powers of
government and of the constitutional integrity of the
judicial process ... 20
That some of our most respected students of constitutional history
consider it high time to stop and assess again the true purpose
of the judicial power is evident in recent publications. Charles C.
Simons, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, recently discussed "Judicial Powers: Their Exercise With-
out Constitutional Safeguards", and pointed out the extent of the
dispersion of judicial power among administrative agencies. He
said:
Upon a number of occasions I have observed that many
if not most of the great controversies that vitally affect the
social and economic interests of the American people are
no longer determined by the exercise of the constitutional
grant of judicial power, but are in a realistic sense decided
with finality by administrative boards and commissions, the
personnel of which is not secured against political, economic
and geographical influences by the safeguards which the
constitutional grant throws about judges to insure the inde-
pendent judgment of the Courts upon which they sit.21
Professor Edwin S. Corwin has recently written a book 22 on
the evolution of liberty as a judicial concept. The distinguished
author discusses "the rise, development, and decline" of that Ameri-
can use of the word liberty which treats it as a constitutional limita-
tion, enforcible by courts against acts of the legislative branch
of government. After guiding us through the labyrinth of decisions
by the U. S. Supreme Court on liberty under the Constitution, he
closes on a note of warning: "It is easy to imagine in the light shed
by current ideologies that the demands upon the legislative power,
national and State, might so multiply in behalf of 'the common
man', whose century this is said to be, that the notion of liberty
against Government and its implement, judicial review, would
be gradually but inexorably crowded to the wall."
The preservation of judicial power in Canada is in striking
contrast to its disintegration in this country. A recent report to the
20Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 688 (1944).
2134 A.B.A.J. 907 (1948).
2 2CORWIN (EDWIN S.), LBERTY AGAMST GOVERNMENT (1948). See generally,
Ben W. Palmer's discussions of dissents, A.B.A.J., July, 1948 to March, 1949.
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Canadian Bar Association as to judicial review of administrative
acts said:
By careful selection of the proper writ, in a manner strangely
reminiscent of common-law pleadings, a lawyer today may
sometimes compel a dilatory official to exercise his statutory
powers. A lawyer may also persuade a court to squash a deci-
sion of an authority who has acted with more haste than
good judgement. Technically, of course, the basis of "re-
view" must be that the authority has acted beyond his
powers, but the practical result of the cases is to give a
right of review where the authority has exercised an appar-
ently urilimited discretion unreasonably or where he has
followed what the court considers improper procedure, which
it calls a "denial of justice".23
If the judicial power is ever to be restored to its proper place
in our government and jurisprudence, there will have to be a
restoration of Natural Law2" to the place which the Founding
Fathers accorded it.25 It was the very source of constitutionalism
in the Middle Ages, as stated above. Later, James Otis, the Father
of the Revolution, Thomas Jefferson, the Author of the Declara-
tion, and James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, made
it the foundation of their principles. Since our "unalienable rights"
are not granted by any temporal power, their source must be in
Natural Law;2" and only through the enforcement of that law by
independent courts can such rights be maintained. If government
itself is to be subject to law, then there must be a judiciary con-
secrated to that law and free from the policies and pressures of
other agencies of government. Moreover, conditions arise-as they
have from Bonham's Case"7 to Tumey v. State of Ohio2 -for
which the positive law is inadequate. Courts must be able to resort
to Natural Law concepts if the administration of judicial power
is to be reasonable and conscionable and litigants are to be relieved
of conflicting regulations and commandments impossible of per-
2335 A.B.AJ. 53 (1949).
24For a clear discussion of the term Natural Law, see Adler, The Doctrine of
Natural Law Philosophy, 1 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 1948, 65
(U. Notre Dame, College of Law).
250. E. MANION, The Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, 1 NATURAL
LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 1948, 3 (U. Notre Dame, College of Law).
2 6CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 22, c. ii.
278 Coke 118a.
28273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).
29Barnard v. Carey, 60 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
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formance."9 Only by such administration of the judicial power
can respect for law be maintained.
In recent years a "dry rot has afflicted our jurisprudence"
which Harold R. McKinnon has thus described with insight and
precision:
The habit of viewing laws as ultimately grounded in norms
inherent in the nature of man and society gave way to ana-
lytical jurisprudence, which views laws as pure facts wholly
disconnected from morals; to historical jurisprudence, for
which the ultimate source of laws is evolving custom; and
to positivism of many varieties but all of them united in
the concept that under the ever changing stream of fact there
is no intelligible abiding substratum and therefore no truth
superior to the transient findings of experimental science.30
This led to a form of modern positivism which concluded that
it was "completely senseless" to say that courts have to "administer
justice . . . There is no justice. Neither is there any objective
'ought' . . . . Thus the entire legal ideology-including rights and
duties, wrongfulness and lawfulness-goes up in smoke."'
Such legal sophistry of course leads not to judicial power but
to judicial impotence.
If our balance of government is to be maintained and our Bill
of Rights preserved, there must be a revival of that sound philos-
ophy upon which they were originally founded. And the judicial
power must be kept intact. As Justice Story said: "The original
or appellate jurisdiction ought not, therefore, to be restrained,
but should be commensurate with the mischiefs intended to be
remedied, and, of course, should extend to all cases whatsoever."32
30Harold R. McKinnon, Natural Law and Positive Law, 1 NATURAL LAW IN-
STITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 1948, 85, 87 (U. Notre Dame, College of Law).
31Vilhelm Lundstedt, Law and Justice: A Criticism of the Method of Justice,
INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PILOSoPHIEs, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROSCOE POUND, 450, 451 (1947).
32Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 335 (1816).
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